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Abstract
We propose to dene the invisible hand by (i) modelling the mecha-
nism itself (not to just assume its existence) and (ii) making explicit the
limit conditions for its working. For that purpose, we simply assimilate
the working of the invisible hand mechanism to the existence of a so-
cial preference such that individual and social optimalities are consistent.
In introducing the possibility of interaction among individuals, we then
suggest that the standard Robinson case or social atomicity is just a
degenerate feature of a more general requirement that we call the Global
Network Agreement. Our main result is that the invisible hand mecha-
nism does keep on working when there is an interaction between Robinson
and Friday if the former (resp. the latter) is sensitive to the latter (resp.
the former) in such a way that they exhibit some agreement in prefer-
ences. Hence, the Robinson casenaturally satises this property since
nor Robinson neither Friday can disagree with himself. But more coop-
erative situations are also allowed in order to extent the invisible hand
mechanism to cases with interactions.
Nous proposons de dénir la Main Invisible sous la forme dun mé-
canisme formel explicite. Pour cela, nous assimilons ce mécanisme à
lexistence dune relation de préférence sociale telle que les optimalités
individuelle et collective soient compatibles. Puis en introduisant une
possibilité dinteraction entre agents, nous suggérons que le cas standard
(Adam Smith) datomicité socialeconstitue le cas limite dune classe plus
générale de situations satisfaisant toutes une certaine contrainte appelée
le Global Network Agreement(ou Accord Global de Réseau). Notre ré-
sultat principal est alors que le mécanisme de la main invisible sapplique
même en présence dinteractions dès lors que les agents qui interagis-
sent sont sensibles en préférence les uns aux autres dune manière telle
quils manifestent entre eux un consensus minimal. Aussi, le cas standard
(chaque agent est un Robinson) satisfait naturellement cette propriété,
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cependant, dautres cas, beaucoup plus coopératifs sont eux aussi aussi
compatibles avec le mécanisme de la main invisible.
JEL Classication : A13-D71-J15
Keywords : Preferences, social interaction, invisible hand
1 Introduction
The idea that vice or selshness leads to virtue or social good appears in 1723
with La Fable des Abeilles or Les Vices Privés Font le Bien Public proposed by
Bernard Mandeville.1 According to Mandeville, a hive is analogous to a human
society. And what do we observe in a hive? Two things. First, the bees seem
to behave in a coordinated and cooperative way while in reality they are just
selsh maximizers of their own (private) welfare. Second, such decentralized
actions of the individual bees promote the hive welfare better than could be
achieved by a central planner bee. How is it possible? In his famous book
on The Wealth of Nations written in 1776, Adam Smith answered: because of
the so-called invisible hand. Two centuries later, the invisible hand metaphor
still works: the liberal heirs of the classical economists can a¢ rm that markets
would spontaneously produce socially optimal results if only government refrains
from interference. Yet, such a use of the Mandeville-Smiths intuition is purely
ideological: it is a defence for laissez-faire capitalism. (The interpretation of the
concept of the invisible hand is denitely subtle and consequently ambiguous:
see Nozick, 1981, or Rothschild, 1994, for further discussions). The existence
and the proper working of the invisible hand mechanism are taken for granted,
without specifying the limit conditions for it to work. In addition, how should
one precisely characterize an invisible hand mechanism? First, the outcome to
be explained must be produced as a result of a decentralized process: there
are no explicit agreements among the individuals. Second, the invisible hand
mechanism must be non-intentional: the individuals do not intend to produce
the outcome, that is social welfare; a by-product of their actions is the social
desirability of the nal outcome. Actually, since the process should work even
if the individuals have no knowledge of the process, it is called invisible.2
In this paper, we propose to dene the invisible hand mechanism in a more
systematic methodological way. Specically, we implicitly consider that it is con-
tingent if the mechanism is actually working. What is interesting is rather (i)
to model the mechanism itself, not to just assume its existence and (ii) to make
explicit the limit conditions for it to work.
For that purpose, recall that an individual optimal decision is a maximal
element of an individual preference order and a social optimal decision is a
maximal element of a social preference order. Then, we suggest that an invisible
hand mechanism naturally works when there is no conict between each indi-
vidual optimal decision and the social optimal one. Consequently, we consider
1Actually, the rst version of this text is a long poem published in 1705 under the title:
The Grumbling Hive or Knaves Turned Honest.
2However, the invisibility is not an essential requirement for a mechanism to be considered
as an invisible hand mechanism. The result in question needs not be unknown to the individ-
uals participating in its production. Modern discussion about the invisible hand allows the
individuals to know the result of their actions. It is nevertheless required that they do not
intend to produce that result. The result should be an unintended consequence of the action,
that is a by-product of intentions to do something else.
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the working of an invisible hand mechanism as the existence of a social pref-
erence for which individual and social optimalities are consistent. The formal
conditions of existence of such a social preference characterize the environment
for the invisible hand mechanism to work.
Traditionally, one thinks that the invisible hand mechanism needs social
atomicity, namely the fact that no individual can inuence the social decision
by means of his only preferences. However, in introducing interactions among
individuals (à la Akerlof, 1997), we suggest that social atomicity, that is the
Robinson case, is a particular feature of a more general requirement that we
call Global Network Agreement : the invisible hand mechanism requires that
individuals agree in some sense in preferences when they interact. In other
words, each Robinson naturally satises this property since no one can disagree
with himself. But other situations, denitely more cooperative, are allowed as
well.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present the
model of interaction and the utility representation of individual preferences
translating interactions (Theorem 1). In Section 3, we model the invisible hand
mechanism and prove the limit condition of its working, namely the presence of
a local network disagreement (Theorem 2). Finally, in Section 4, we illustrate
our result with two examples where the invisible hand mechanism works: rst,
the Robinson case (no interaction) and second, an Interaction case with Global
Network Agreement.
2 Individuals
2.1 Individual Preferences
Consider a given and nite set S of individuals i (i : 1; :::; n). Call coalition any
nonempty subset of S.
Consider an arbitrary given set C  R of (monetary) consequences expressed
by real numbers and X a set of acts, that is functions x from the set S of indi-
viduals to that C of consequences. Any act x of X is such that x (i) corresponds
to the consequence of the act x for individual i.
For any coalition A  S, x (A) denotes the tuple [x (i)]i2A. Furthermore,
given a coalition A and two acts x and y, an act denoted (xA; y A) is such that
(xA; y A) (i) = x (i) for all individuals i 2 A and (xA; y A) (j) = y (j) for all
other individuals j =2 A. By convention, we write (i) x  y if x (i)  y (i) for all
individuals i 2 S, (ii) x > y if x  y and x (i) > y (i) for some individuals i 2 S
and (iii) x y if x (i) > y (i) for all individuals i 2 S.
Each individual i 2 S is characterized by a preference relation <i, that is a
binary relation dened over X X such that x <i y means that for individual
i, x is at least as good as y. Two acts x; y are considered indi¤erent, which is
denoted x i y, when we simultaneously have x <i y and y <i x.
Besides, all preference relations are supposed to be (i) nontrivial: for all
i 2 S, (xi; z i) i (yi; z i) for some x; y; z 2 X and (ii) monotone: for all i 2 S,
if x (i) > y (i), then (xi; z i) i (yi; z i) for all z 2 X.
We also assume the following standard axioms.
Axiom 1 (Complete Weak Ordering) : 8i 2 S, the preference relation <i
is a complete weak-order on X2.
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Axiom 2 (Continuity) : 8i 2 S, 8x; y; z 2 X such that x <i y <i z, there
exists  2 [0; 1] such that x+ (1  ) z i y.
Axiom 3 (Independence) : 8i 2 S, 8x; y; z 2 X such that x <i y, 8 2 ]0; 1[:
x+ (1  ) z <i y + (1  ) z.
2.2 Interaction and vNM Expected Utility Representa-
tion
Several economic situations involve basic interactions sometimes called network
externalitiessuch as urban congestion, fashion e¤ect, conformism or altruism
and so on... The common idea of all these approaches is that individuals are
assumed to be interdependent whenever their preferences may be a¤ected by
the social neighborhood (see e.g., Postlewaite, 1998, Billot, 2003). Here, if i
interacts with j then i may be su¢ ciently sensitive to jto broaden his own
set of preferences determinants in order to encapsulate the consequence for j of
all acts i faces.3 For instance, Luttmer (2001) shows that numerous young black
lawyers issued from the poor suburb of Chicago nally militate in favor of a
scal policy that proposes to largely redistribute towards the poor social classes
(even if, for that purpose, they will individually pay more taxes) rather than
choosing to support a liberal program which maximizes their selsh interests.
2.2.1 Interaction
Consider that there exists a binary relation I dened on S2 such that iIjmeans
that i interacts with jand assume that this relation I is reexive: 8i 2 S, iIi.
Consider now, for any i 2 S, a probability distribution pi : 2S ! [0; 1] withP
j2S pi (j) = 1 where pi (j) is the probability for i to be sensitive to j. Assume
that if i has no interaction with j, then pi (j) = 0, i.e. is sensitivity to j is null.
On contrary, each time iIj, pi (j) > 0 and i is sensitive to what happens to j.
(Intuitively, the more i interacts with j, the more he is sensitive to him.) Note
that since we suppose I to be reexive, then pi (i) > 0. Finally, the support of
the distribution pi naturally corresponds to is individual network, that is the
set of all individuals with whom he has an interaction. We denote it Si:
Si = fj 2 S : iIjg =def fj 2 S : pi (j) > 0g . (1)
Note that the reexivity of I can also be written as [8i 2 S, i 2 Si].4
Two cases occur:
(1) (Ic as Interaction case). There exists at least one individual whose
network is nonsingleton:
[9i; j 2 S, i 6= j, s.t. iIj]() [9i 2 S s.t. pi (i) < 1]() [9i 2 S s.t. Si 6= fig] .
For convenience, we say in that case that pi is a nonsingleton distribution.
3This sort of interaction does not suppose any strategic behavior nor coordination: for
instance, an individual i can be sensitive to what happens to another individual j without j
being sensitive to i.
4 In the language of epistemic logics à la Kripke (1963) (see for instance Hughes and Cress-
well, 1989, or Billot and Walliser, 1999), the individual network Si is called a syntactical
operator and the distribution pi is its valued semantical counterpart while the society S plays
the role of the set of possible worlds.
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(2) (Rc as Robinson case). All individual networks are singleton:
[8i 2 S, /9j 2 S, i 6= j, s.t. iIj]() [8i 2 S, pi (i) = 1]() [8i 2 S, Si = fig] .
For convenience, we say in that case that any pi is a singleton distribution.
The standard case, namely that which is commonly used in general micro-
economics, is obviously given by Rc.
Remark 1 : Transitivity of the interaction I  i.e. 8i; j; k 2 S, [iIj and jIk])
[iIk]  , can also be written as [j 2 Si ) Sj  Si].5
2.2.2 vNM Expected Utility Representation
Following Morris intuition in (1997, 2000), we then propose to translate the be-
havior of an individual who is sensitive to other individuals through the prob-
ability distribution which a¤ects his utilities in a setting à la von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) where ui (x (i)) translates is utility when facing the con-
sequence of x for him, namely x (i), while ui (x (j)) corresponds to is utility
when considering the consequence of x for j, namely x (j).
Theorem 1 (vNM) : Under A1-A3, for each individual i 2 S, there exists a
strictly increasing and continuous utility function ui : X ! R such that:
x <i y ,
X
j2S
pi (j)ui (x (j)) 
X
j2S
pi (j)ui (y (j)) , (2)
where pi is a given probability distribution, pi : 2S ! [0; 1] with
P
j2S pi (j) = 1,
translating is interactions in S. Moreover, ui is unique up to a linear transfor-
mation.
The proof is strictly equivalent to that of Proposition 5.4 in Kreps (1988,
Ch. 5., 46-50).
Therefore each individual preference <i satisfying A1-A3 has a vNM repre-
sentation as dened in (2). This way, if iIj, i takes into account - by empathy
- the consequence x (j) of x weighted by the degree pi (j) of his sensitivity to j.
On the contrary, if i does not interact with j, the inuence of the consequence
x (j) in is evaluation of x is null.
In the Robinson case, (2) naturally becomes:
x <i y , ui (x (i))  ui (y (i)) (3)
since Si = fig (see also Samet and Schmeidler, 2003, for the interpretation of
such a constraint as the qualication rule of liberalism).
Throughout the sequel, we consider that each individual preferences has a
vNM representation as dened by (2).
5See Billot and Walliser (1999, §2.4, 190-192) for details about the way semantical proper-
ties can be equivalently interpreted in syntax.
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3 Invisible Hand
Consider a nite subset  of acts,   X, and call it a problem. A problem
corresponds to a particular decision which must be made by the society S.
For each problem   X and each individual i 2 S, it can be dened a set
of is optimal solutions, that is the acts dominating in preferences all other acts
that are candidates to solve the problem:
i = fx 2  : x <i y, for all y 2 g . (4)
Proposition 1 : Under A1, each individual optimal solution set i associated
to any problem  is nonempty.
Proof : Straightforward by niteness of  and weak-ordering completeness
of <i.
Dene now a decision rule as a function  : S !  and say  to be optimal
when
8i 2 S,  (i) 2 i. (5)
Remark 2 : A decision rule  does take into account the individuals social
network since each i is based upon is preference and each is preference is
related to Si by its vNM representation as dened in (2).
When such an optimal decision rule is followed,  (i) determines the acts
which dominate - for i - all other possible solutions of the problem. Such a rule
generates an abstract new act  !' , not necessarily in , such that ' (i) = i (i),
8i 2 S (where i (i) is the is consequence of the act  (i)).The class of acts
generated by optimal decision rules is denoted  and dened as follows:
 = fx 2 X : x (i) = i (i) , 8i 2 S, for some optimal g . (6)
Proposition 2 : Under A1-A3 the class  of issues generated by optimal
decision rules is nonempty.
Proof : This follows from Proposition 1 and (6).
Each element x of the nonempty class  of acts generated by optimal deci-
sion rules is designed such that the individual consequence x (i) is <i-maximal
by denition of i and (5-6). Then, if there is no social preference such that
each act of  is weakly preferred to any other act of the problem , we know
that a conict arises between the society S as a whole and some of its members:
hence the invisible hand does not seem to work. A contrario, if there is no con-
tradiction between the society S as a whole and any of its members in the sense
where the best decision for the former is consistent with each best decision of
the others, the invisible hand seems to work.
Introduce one supplementary condition on the individual preferences.
Given individual preferences (<i)i2S and a coalition A  S, say that x <A y
if x <i y for all i 2 A, and x A y if x <A y and x i y for some i 2 A.
Global Network Agreement : 8i 2 S, x <
i
y ) x <
Si
y for all x; y 2 X.
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Global Network Agreement means that within each given individual network,
no conict arises between the individual and its own network. In return a local
(network) disagreement corresponds to the fact that there exists an individual,
say i, such that x <i y ; x <Si y for all x; y 2 X, i.e. 9x0; y0 2 X such that
x0 <i y0 while y0 Si x0.
Lemma 1 : In the Robinson case, there is a Global Network Agreement.
Straigthforward from (Rc).
Note, indeed, that a Global Network Agreement does not imply that Si =
fig, 8i 2 S. Thus, let us study other situations, especially situations where
individual networks are nonsingleton.
Lemma 2 : There is a Global Network Agreement i¤ the interaction I is tran-
sitive.
Proof : ()) Transitivity of I can also be written as [j 2 Si ) Sj  Si] (see
Remark 1). It means that, 8i; j; k 2 S, if i 2 Sj and j 2 Sk then i 2 Sk.
Suppose now, on the contrary, that there exist three individuals 1; 2; 3 2 S such
that 1 2 S2, 2 2 S3 but 1 =2 S3. Let x (1) = 1 and x (i) = 0 for all i 6= 1.
By monotonicity of the preferences, x 1 0n (since 1 2 S1 by reexivity of I),
x 2 0n (since 1 2 S2), x 3 0n (since 1 =2 S3) and nally x <i 0n for all i 2 S,
where 0n = (0; :::; 0). Thus, x S3 0n since 2 2 S3. But, x 3 0n while x S3 0n
means that there is a local disagreement.
(() Suppose that there is a local disagreement. It means that, for some i 2 S,
x Si 0n while x i 0n. Hence, there exists j 2 Si such that x j 0n. Let
x (k) = 1 and x (i) = 0 for all i 6= k. If x j 0n, this means that k 2 Sj , k 6= j,
i.e. fj; kg  Sj . Since x i 0n, then k =2 Si. Consequently j 2 Si 6) Sj  Si
and I is not transitive.
Dene a social preference < as a preference relation which satises (A1-A3)
and a Strong Monotonicity condition:
8i 2 S, 8x; y 2 X, (xi; z i) < (yi; z i), x (i)  y (i) . (SM)
This condition translates the fact that, ceteris paribus, the society is better o¤
when allocating more than less to any given individual.
The modeling of an invisible hand mechanism that we propose is then that
acts in  (which may or may not be included in the problem ) must be at
least as good for the social preference < as acts in , that is x < y for all acts
x 2  and y 2 .
Invisible Hand (IH) : There exists a social preference < such that for each
nite problem   X there exists an act x 2  such that x < y, for all
y 2 .
The Global Network Agreement condition implies that the sensitivity of an
individual to another one, when it exists (i.e. in the Interaction case), can be
translated through its individual network. Nevertheless, this result does not
clarify the implication relation between IH and a Global Network Agreement.
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Does IH implies Global Agreement or the other way round? If it is straight-
forward that IH is consistent with the Robinson case, that is when all the
individual networks are singleton, we must know if it can be consistent as well
with nonsingleton individual networks.
Theorem 2 : If IH holds, then there is a Global Network Agreement.
Lemma 1 shows that there is a Global Network Agreement i¤ the interaction
I is transitive. Hence we have now to precise the relationship between IH and
the properties of the interaction I:
Lemma 3 : If IH holds, then the interaction I is transitive.
Proof : Suppose that I does not satisfy transitivity, i.e. [j 2 Si 6) Sj  Si]
for some i; j; k 2 S. This means for instance that there exist three individuals
1; 2; 3 2 S such that 2 2 S1, 1 2 S3 but 2 =2 S3. Now, by A2, it is possible to
dene a problem  = fx; 0g where the act x is dened as ("1; 1; "3; 0; :::; 0)
(with x (1) = "1, x (2) =  1, x (3) =  "3 and x (i) = 0 for all i 6= 1; 2; 3 with
"1, "3 positive and very small) such that the act 0n 1 x (since f1; 2g  S1 and
"1 very small), 0n 2 x (since 2 2 S2 while 1 =2 S2 and 3 =2 S2) but x 3 0n.6
Hence, if y 2 , this implies y (3) =  "3 and y (i) = 0 for all i 6= 3, i.e.
 = f0; 0; y(3); 0; :::; 0g. Thus, 0n  y for all y 2 . This is a contradiction
with IH.
Proof of Theorem 2: It is straightforward from Lemmas 1 and 2.
If a conict arises between the society as a whole and some of its members,
the invisible hand does not work. This is clearly consistent with a society based
on individuals who behave like Robinson. However, Theorem 2 shows that it
is possible for the invisible hand mechanism to be relevant whenever Robinson
meets Friday who meets... if the interaction between the individuals is transitive
such that there is no local disagreement. In that sense, if individuals throught
networks are su¢ ciently connected in preferences, the standard invisible hand
mechanism can be extented to subsets of individuals.
4 Examples
As an illustration of situations where IH holds, consider the two following ex-
amples:
Example 1 (Robinson Case) : Suppose three individuals f1; 2; 3g whose in-
dividual distributions are singleton, i.e. S1 = f1g, S2 = f2g and S3 = f3g, and
utilities are given by ui (x) = x for i : 1; 2; 3. Then, for two programs x; y:8<: x <1 yx <2 y
x <3 y
,
,
,
x (1)  y (1) ,
x (2)  y (2) ,
x (3)  y (3) .
Consider now the following problem:  = fx; 0g, where the act x =  "; 1; "2,
i.e. x (1) = ", x (2) =  1 and x (3) =  "2. Now, it is obvious that the act
6Take for instance, p3(1) = p3 (3) = :5 with "1 > "3 > 0.
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0n=3 = (0; 0; 0) is optimal for individuals 2 and 3 and the act x is optimal for
1. Thus,  = f(x (1) ; 0; 0)g, that is ("; 0; 0). Now, by SM, the act ("; 0; 0) 
(0; 0; 0) for each social preference and then IH holds.
Example 2 (Interaction Case with Global Agreement) : Suppose three
individuals f1; 2; 3g such that 1 and 3 have nonsingleton individual distributions,
i.e. 
p1 (1) =
1
2 = p1 (2),
p3 (2) =
1
2 = p3 (3)
while 2s individual distribution is p2 (2) = 1. This corresponds to S1 = f1; 2g,
S2 = f2g and S3 = f2; 3g. Suppose that all utilities are given by ui (x) = x for
i : 1; 2; 3. Then, for two acts x; y, we have:8<: x <1 yx <2 y
x <3 y
,
,
,
1
2x (1) +
1
2x (2)  12y (1) + 12y (2) ,
x (2)  y (2) ,
1
2x (2) +
1
2x (3)  12y (2) + 12y (3) .
Note that there is here a Global Network Agreement and dene the social pref-
erence <as:
x < y , 1
6
x (1) +
2
3
x (2) +
1
6
x (3)  1
6
y (1) +
2
3
y (2) +
1
6
y (3) .
In order to illustrate that this social preference satises IH, consider any prob-
lem  and optimal decision rule . Then for any y 2 , the optimality of 
yields: 8>>>><>>>>:
1
21 (1) +
1
22 (1)  12y (1) + 12y (2) ,
2 (2)  y (2) ,
2 (2)  2 (1) ,
2 (2)  2 (3) ,
1
22 (3) +
1
23 (3)  12y (2) + 12y (3) .
Multiplying the two rst and the very last inequalities by 13 , the two others by
1
6
and summing up gives rise to the following equation:
1
6
1 (1) +
2
3
2 (2) +
1
6
3 (3)  1
6
y (1) +
2
3
y (2) +
1
6
y (3) .
Hence, we can conclude that x < y for all x 2 . Since it works for every
y 2 , then IH holds.
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